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Abstract
The possibility of having a science of human life brings 
into question whether the methods use in the sciences 
can be successfully applied in the prediction of human 
behaviour. This further questions the demarcation between 
science and the social sciences. This paper, however, 
argues that the use of DN model of explanation both 
in the social and natural sciences portends a boundary 
deconstruction of the two fields of enquiry. While 
engaging critical analysis method of enquiry, this paper 
dissects the DN model of explanation and argues that 
the social sciences are sciences and as such we can have 
scientific laws to predict, explain and control human 
behaviour. 
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Convinced that the three cardinal aims of science are 
prediction, control, and explanation and that the greatest 
of these is explanation, this paper examines the deductive 
nomological model of science which enjoys a position of 
near-orthodoxy, although according to Alan Ryan it “has 
to fight for this position under a sniping fire from more or 
less critical alternatives.” (Ryan, 1970, p. 46) Roughly put 
this view of explanation require the adducing of general 
laws, with the status of empirical hypotheses about the 
natural order, from which in conjunction with statements 
of initial conditions, we can deductively infer statements 
about empirical consequences. The element of this 
account have a long history; but since the early nineteenth 
century it has enjoyed almost canonical status, defended 
by such men as Laplace, Whewell and Mill at that time, 
and by such writers as Popper, Hempel and Nagel today. 
The goals of this paper are therefore twofold. In the first 
place, we must try to understand the point of insisting on 
the deductive nomological model of explanation, and try 
to follow the consequences of this insistence; then we 
have to raise some of the doubts which have been brought 
out by critics of this account. Thus, the paper will be 
arguing that deductive nomological model of explanation 
is applicable both in the natural and the social sciences 
as Alan Ryan will put it “I do not propose to argue that 
the hypothetico-deductive picture of explanation does 
not apply to the social sciences; for it is my view that its 
merits and demerits are visible more or less evenly across 
the scientific spectrum”. (p.47)
According to Ehiakhamen J. O., Ernest Nagel in 
his The Structure of Science identifies four types of 
explanations which are the deductive nomonological 
model, the probabilistic model, the functional and 
the genetic model of explanation (Ehiakhamen, 
2005, p.17). This paper thus examines the deductive 
nomological model of explanation which is mostly 
attributed to the works of C. G. Hempel. Hempel is 
unquestionably the most representative advocate of the 
epistemic interpretation of explanation or the Deductive-
Nomological (DN) model, as explained in his covering 
law. An epistemic theory tackles phenomena only 
logically, based on the researcher’s experience (empiricism 
and by extension logical positivism) and doesn’t 
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physically connect the phenomenon or event that needs 
to be explained with the actual facts claimed to explain 
it. In this sense unobservable entities are not necessary to 
understand why an explanation is true, whereas a realist 
interpretation of explanation considers these entities as 
real; the explanation is a literal description of external 
reality (IEP).
• Realist: a true and explanatory theory can describe 
world’s causal structure
• Epistemic: a true and explanatory theory orders our 
experience to a greater degree
Salmon, on the other hand, has introduced a realistic 
(non epistemic) model, the statistical relevance model that 
takes into account flaws and weakness of the Hempel’s 
covering law.
T H E  D E D U C T I V E - N O M O L O G I C A L 
MODEL
According to the Deductive-Nomological Model (hereafter 
refer to as the DN model), a scientific explanation consists 
of two major “constituents”: an explanadum, a sentence 
“describing the phenomenon to be explained” (p.18) 
and an explanans, “the class of those sentences which 
are adduced to account for the phenomenon” (Hempel, 
1965 p. 247). For the explanans to successfully explain 
the explanadum several conditions must be met. First, 
“the explanadum must be a logical consequence of the 
explanans” and “the sentences constituting the explanans 
must be true”. Alan Ryan will say “the explanans must 
entail the explanadum”. (Alan Ryan, Op. Cit., p.49) 
That is, the explanation should take the form of a sound 
deductive argument in which the explanadum follows as 
a conclusion from the premises in the explanans. This 
is the “deductive” component of the model. Second, the 
explanans must contain at least one “law of nature” and 
this must be an essential premise in the derivation in 
the sense that the derivation of the explanadum would 
not be valid if this premise were removed. This is the 
“nomological” component of the model—“nomological” 
being a philosophical term of art which, suppressing some 
niceties, means (roughly) “lawful”. In its most general 
formulation, the DN model is meant to apply both to 
the explanation of “general regularities” or “laws” such 
as (to use Hempel and Oppenheim’s examples) why 
light conforms to the law of refraction and also to the 
explanation of particular events, conceived as occurring at 
a particular time and place, such as the bent appearance of 
the partially submerged oars of a rowboat on a particular 
occasion of viewing. As an additional illustration of a DN 
explanation of a particular event, consider a derivation of 
the position that “all Edos respect Igue Festivals” amounts 
to the claim that we cannot find an instance of someone 
who is both a Edo and yet does not respect the Igue 
Festival. According to Alan Ryan if we recall the basic 
point about deductive argument, it was that we cannot 
both accept the premises and deny the conclusion; so that 
when one of the premise is a general statement as “All 
Edos respect the Igue Festivals” the other is a singular 
statement that here is a man who is a Edo, we have to 
accept that he respects the new yam ceremonies. 
A DN explanation of an occurrence is a valid deduction 
whose conclusion states that the outcome to be explained 
did in fact occur. The deductive argument is called an 
explanation, its premises are called the explanans (L: 
explaining) and the conclusion is called the explanadum 
(L: to be explained). Depending on a number of additional 
qualifications, an explanation may be ranked on a scale 
from potential to true. (p. 49)
Thus the DN explanation is an account of the 
explanadum that indicates how it follows deductively 
from a law of nature (“covering-law” account). The 
specificity of this explanation is given the conditions 
of adequacy define what a DN explanation is. In other 
words, an explanation is a DN explanation if and only if it 
satisfies conditions 1-4.
CONDITIONS OF ADEQUACY
1. Must be a valid-deductive argument with premises 
stating the explanans and the conclusion stating the 
explanadum.
2. Premises (explanans) must contain a law.
3. Explanans must have empirical content.
4. Explanans must be true.
According to Hempel and the DN model scientific 
explanations follow the typical structure of an argument, 
consisting of a set of premises and a conclusion. The 
conclusion says that the phenomenon to be explained 
is true and the premises explain why the conclusion is 
actually true. Hempel argues that a set of premises counts 
as a scientific explanation of a conclusion only if:
−The argument is deductive (the premises entail the 
conclusion)
−The premises are true
−The premises consist at least one general law (or law 
of nature), hence nomological model. He also resembles 
the relation of explanation and prediction as the two sides 
of the same coin:
−Every scientific explanation is potentially a prediction
−Every re l iable  predic t ion is  potent ia l ly  an 
explanation.
General laws or particular facts represent the explanans, 
which imply the explanadum, (Bruder, 1966. p.63) i.e. the 
phenomenon to be explained. Regarding the nomological 
component of this model, Hempel distinguishes between 
the generalizations that are “accidentally true” and those 
that are “laws”. For example:
“All members of the Greensbury School Board for 
1964 are bald’’ is only accidentally true.
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Here we cannot claim that a particular student 
belonged to the 1964 Greensbury school board to explain 
why he is bald.
“All gases expand when heated under constant 
pressure” is a law.
Thus, we could use this law to explain why a gas has 
expanded, given the fact that it has been heated keeping 
pressure constant. It is difficult, however, for philosophers 
to agree on when generalizations comprise laws and 
when not and since there is no generally accepted account 
of lawhood, this will remain an easy point of critic on 
Hempel’s law.
Why suppose that all (or even some) explanations have 
a DN structure? There are two ideas which play a central 
motivating role in Hempel’s 1965 discussion. The first 
connects the information provided by a DN argument with 
a certain conception of what it is to achieve understanding 
of why something happens—it appeals to an idea about the 
object or point of giving an explanation. Hempel writes:
… a DN explanation answers the question “Why 
did the explanadum-phenomenon occur?” by showing 
that the phenomenon resulted from certain particular 
circumstances, specified in C1, C2, …, Ck, in accordance 
with the laws L1, L2, …, Lr. By pointing this out, the 
argument shows that, given the particular circumstances 
and the laws in question, the occurrence of the 
phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this sense 
that the explanation enables us to understand why the 
phenomenon occurred. (Hempel, 1965. p.337)
One can think of IS explanation as involving a natural 
generalization of this idea. While an IS explanation does 
not show that the explanadum-phenomenon was to be 
expected with certainty, it does the next best thing: it 
shows that the explanadum-phenomenon is at least to be 
expected with high probability and in this way provides 
understanding. Stated more generally, both the DN and IS 
models, share the common idea that, as Salmon puts it, 
“the essence of scientific explanation can be described as 
nomic expectability—that is expectability on the basis of 
lawful connections” (Salmon, 1989. p.57)
The second main motivation for the DN model 
has to do with the role of causal claims in scientific 
explanation. There is considerable disagreement among 
philosophers about whether all explanations in science 
and in ordinary life are causal and also disagreement 
about what the distinction (if any) between causal and 
non-causal explanations consist in. Nonetheless, virtually 
everyone, including Hempel, agrees that many scientific 
explanations cite information about causes. However, 
Hempel, along with most other early advocates of the 
DN model, is unwilling to take the notion of causation 
as primitive in the theory of explanation—that is, he was 
unwilling to simply say that X figures in an explanation of 
Y if and only if X causes Y. Instead, adherents of the DN 
model have generally looked for an account of causation 
that satisfies the empiricist requirements. In particular, 
advocates of the DN model have generally accepted 
a broadly Humean or regularity theory of causation, 
according to which (very roughly) all causal claims imply 
the existence of some corresponding regularity (a “law”) 
linking cause to effect. This is then taken to show that all 
causal explanations “imply,” perhaps only “implicitly,” 
that such a law/regularity exists and hence that laws are 
“involved” in all such explanations, just as the DN model 
claims.
Hempel and Oppenheim’s essay “Studies in the Logic 
of Explanation,” published in volume 15 of the journal 
Philosophy of Science, gave an account of the deductive-
nomological explanation. A scientific explanation of a 
fact is a deduction of a statement (called the explanadum) 
that describes the fact we want to explain; the premises 
(called the explanans) are scientific laws and suitable 
initial conditions. For an explanation to be acceptable, the 
explanans must be true.
According to the deductive-nomological model, 
the explanation of a fact is thus reduced to a logical 
relationship between statements: the explanadum is a 
consequence of the explanans. This is a common method 
in the philosophy of logical positivism. Pragmatic aspects 
of explanation are not taken into consideration. Another 
feature is that an explanation requires scientific laws; 
facts are explained when they are subsumed under laws. 
So the question arises about the nature of a scientific law. 
According to Hempel and Oppenheim, a fundamental 
theory is defined as a true statement whose quantifiers 
are not removable (that is, a fundamental theory is not 
equivalent to a statement without quantifiers), and which 
do not contain individual constants. Every generalized 
statement which is a logical consequence of a fundamental 
theory is a derived theory. The underlying idea for this 
definition is that a scientific theory deals with general 
properties expressed by universal statements. References 
to specific space-time regions or to individual things are 
not allowed. For example, Newton’s laws are true for 
all bodies in every time and in every space. But there 
are laws (e.g., the original Kepler laws) that are valid 
under limited conditions and refer to specific objects, like 
the Sun and its planets. Therefore, there is a distinction 
between a fundamental theory, which is universal without 
restrictions, and a derived theory that can contain a 
reference to individual objects. Note that it is required that 
theories are true; implicitly, this means that scientific laws 
are not tools to make predictions, but they are genuine 
statements that describe the world—a realistic point of 
view.
There is another intriguing characteristic of the 
Hempel-Oppenheim model, which is that explanation 
and prediction have exactly the same logical structure: 
an explanation can be used to forecast and a forecast is 
a valid explanation. Finally, the deductive-nomological 
model accounts also for the explanation of laws; in that 
case, the explanadum is a scientific law and can be proved 
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with the help of other scientific laws.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation, published in 1965, 
faces the problem of inductive explanation, in which the 
explanans include statistical laws. According to Hempel, 
in such kind of explanation the explanans give only a high 
degree of probability to the explanadum, which is not a 
logical consequence of the premises. The following is a 
very simple example.
The relative frequency of P with respect to Q is r 
The object a belongs to P 
————————————————– 
Thus, a belongs to Q
The conclusion “a belongs to Q” is not certain, for it is 
not a logical consequence of the two premises. According 
to Hempel, this explanation gives a degree of probability 
r to the conclusion. Note that the inductive explanation 
requires a covering law: the fact is explained by means of 
scientific laws. But now the laws are not deterministic; 
statistical laws are admissible. However, in many respects 
the inductive explanation is similar to the deductive 
explanation.
• Both deductive and inductive explanations are 
nomological ones (that is, they require universal laws).
• The relevant fact is the logical relation between 
explanans and explanadum: in deductive explanation, 
the latter is a logical consequence of the former, whereas 
in inductive explanation, the relationship is an inductive 
one. But in either model, only logical aspects are relevant; 
pragmatic features are not taken in account.
• The symmetry between explanation and prediction is 
preserved.
• The explanans must be true.
According to Alan Ryan, Hempel and Oppenheim’s 
view is threefold: 
the first is the formal requirement that the statements laying 
down the laws and initial conditions should entail the statement 
laying down the conclusion; the second is the material 
requirement that the premises should be true – or more 
cautiously that they should be well corroborated; the last is a 
consequence of these requirements, that the explanans should 
be empirically testable, by being open to refutation should it 
predict what is not the case. Only under these conditions do we 
empirically or causally explain why an event had to happen as 
it did. And it is practically a defining quality of an empiricist 
philosophy of science that it sets up these standards as the 
standards for true explanation. (Alan Ryan, Op. Cit, p.53)
Alan Ryan argues that the enumerate generalization 
usually made by the natural scientists and social scientists 
alike make them to fall into “deepish waters”. He argued 
that “it is a frequent criticism of social scientists’ work 
that they present us with something less than adequate 
explanations”. That they are prone to leave us with mere 
enumerative generalizations, without causally analyzing 
them. Thus the pioneering work on voting behavour called 
“Voting” Ryan says “was sometimes criticized because 
it told us e.g. only that a certain proportion of Catholics 
vote Democrat; the authors of Voting failed to tell us why 
Catholics tended to vote Democrat rather than Republican 
(and even more interesting what were the causes behind 
the deviation of those Catholics who voted for some other 
party)”. (p.56)
STRENGTHS OF THE DEDUCTIVE 
NOMOLOGICAL MODEL OF EXPLANATION
Although the DN  model does not only apply to 
explanations of particular facts (such as the floating of 
our ice cube) but it applies to explanations of general 
regularities. (Example: the derivation of Kepler’s laws 
from Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation) However, 
the D-N model does not apply when laws are probabilistic. 
For this case, two related models have been introduced, 
the inductive-statistical (I-S) model for explanations of 
particular facts by probabilistic laws (example: explaining 
a patient’s recovery from an infection by his taking of 
penicillin); the deductive-statistical (D-S) model for 
explanations of probabilistic regularities by more general 
probabilistic laws (example: the derivation of the half-
life of uranium-238 from the laws of nuclear physics). 
(Hempel, 1965) 
Since DN explanations are characterized by the fact 
that the explanans contains at least one law of nature, we 
need to know how to distinguish laws from other general 
statements. Consider the two statements from Salmon:
1 No gold sphere has a mass greater than 100’000 kg.
2 No enriched uranium sphere has a mass greater than 
100’000 kg.
Both statements are completely general and (most 
probably) true. What is the difference between them? 
Statement 1 is a lawful generalization, while 2 is an 
accidental generalization. But what is lawfulness? 
Statement 2 supports counterfactuals, while 1 does not. 
But the notion of counterfactual depends on the notion of 
law. Consider the example: “The impact of my knee on 
the desk caused the tipping over of the inkwell.” (Salmon, 
1989) This statement seems perfectly explanatory, but 
it does not have a DN structure. Possible reply by the 
proponent of the DN model: would read “cause” needs 
to be analyzed in terms of regularities (and, ultimately, 
laws), so the example really has a hidden DN structure. 
However, it is not clear whether the hidden structure 
strategy can be made to work.
One can explain the length l of the shadow cast by 
a flagpole by deriving it from the height h of the pole, 
the angle of the sun above the horizon and laws about 
the propagation of light. But in the same way, one could 
“explain” the height of the pole by deriving it from l and 
the same laws. 
All males who take birth control pills fail to get 
pregnant.
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James Musa is a male who has been taking birth 
control pills.
James Musa fails to get pregnant.
To those that argued that the DN model does not state 
sufficient conditions for what it is to be an explanation; 
something can conform to the DN scheme without being 
an explanation. Some possible reactions have been to 
find additional conditions, which, together with the 
DN-conditions are sufficient (unificationist model of 
explanation). Note that this approach still relies on the 
hidden structure strategy. 
WEAKNESSES OF THE DEDUCTIVE 
NOMOLOGICAL MODEL OF EXPLANATION
In his The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Alan Ryan 
discusses four weaknesses of this model of explanation. 
The first is the problem of probabilistic explanation and 
the other three is concerned in ways in which the existence 
of theories must modify this account. The problems 
pose by the existence of theories can be summarized 
as, first, the picture of scientific progress offered does 
various kinds of violence to the actual course of scientific 
advance, second that the statements occurring in theories 
do not seem in any clear way to be generalizations of, or 
from, the statements describing the events they explain, 
and third, that a more coherent account of the nature of 
theories and of explanation generally can only be given 
when we give due weight to the importance of causal 
sequences. (Alan Ryan, Op. Cit, p.68)
In addition, his opponents claim that Hempel’s model 
is too strict because it excludes some bona fide scientific 
explanations. While others claim that it is too liberal 
because it allows explanations as scientific that obviously 
aren’t. (Okasha, 2002. p.23) This occurs due to the 
asymmetric relation of explanation, which contradicts 
Hempel’s implication: if x explains y, given a general 
law and additional facts, then we cannot take for granted 
that y explains x, given the same laws and facts. There 
are several counterexamples to the sufficiency of the DN 
model. The most known ones are the following:
The story of James not being pregnant after taking 
birth-control pills. Here the need of relevant information is 
emphasized. Irrelevant information to the phenomenon’s 
occurrence can easily lead to non-realistic explanations 
of the phenomenon. James is not pregnant, not because 
of taking contraception pills, but because he is actually a 
man (explanatory irrelevance).
Three kinds of objections to the DN account have 
also been especially important for the subsequent 
development of the philosophy of explanation. The first 
kind of objection, developed by Kyburg, Salmon, and 
others, points to the DN theory’s inability to account 
for judgments of explanatory relevance. The paradigm 
is the following argument, which satisfies all of the DN 
account’s criteria for a good explanation of the event of a 
particular teaspoon of salt’s dissolving:
The teaspoon of salt was hexed (meaning that certain 
hand gestures were made over the salt),
The salt was placed in water,
All hexed salt dissolves when placed in water, thus
The salt dissolved.
The explanation appears to attribute the salt’s 
dissolving in part to its being hexed, when in fact the 
hexing is irrelevant. There are various responses to 
the counter-example that aim to preserve as much of 
the DN account as possible, for example, holding that 
the generalization about hexed salt is not a true law, or 
imposing the requirement that a DN explanation use 
the most general law available. Salmon’s much less 
conservative reaction is to conclude that Hempel is 
wrong to think of explanation in terms of expectability, 
therefore of explanations as kinds of argument. The 
relation between the factors cited in an explanation and 
the explanadum itself, Salmon holds, is not epistemic, 
but ontic; it should be a physical relevance relation—a 
relation of statistical relevance, he first proposes (Salmon, 
1970), or a relation of causal relevance, as he later comes 
to believe. The faulty explanation of the salt’s dissolving 
is to be discarded, argues Salmon, not because of some 
formal or logical defect, but because it cites an event, 
the hexing of the salt, that fails to bear the appropriate 
relevance relation to the explanadum.
The second important objection to the DN account is 
perhaps also the most famous: it shows, most philosophers 
would agree, that the DN account pays insufficient 
attention to the explanatory role of causal relations. The 
height of a flagpole can be cited, along with the position 
of the sun and the law that light travels in straight lines, 
to explain the length of the flagpole’s shadow. The DN 
account is well able to make sense of this explanation: 
it can be cast in the form of a sound, law-involving 
argument. But now take this same argument and switch 
the premise stating the height of the flagpole with the 
premise stating the length of the shadow. You now have 
a sound, law-involving argument for the height of the 
flagpole that cites, among other things, the length of the 
shadow—thus, according to the DN account, you have 
an explanation of the height of the flagpole that cites, as 
in explainer, the length of the shadow. This consequence 
of the DN account—that the height of a flagpole can be 
explained by the length of its shadow—seems obviously 
wrong, and it is wrong, it seems, because a cause cannot 
be explained by its own effects.
A further famous example strongly suggests that 
effects can only be explained by their causes, together 
with the laws and background conditions in virtue of 
which they are causes. Suppose that the arrival of a certain 
kind of weather front is always followed by a storm, and 
that a certain reading on a barometer is a sure sign that 
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such a front has arrived. Then a barometer reading of this 
sort is always followed by a storm. The storm cannot be 
explained, however, by citing the barometer reading and 
the fact that such readings are always followed by storms, 
though these two facts together satisfy the requirements 
of the DN account. A constant, robust correlation is 
not, it appears, enough for explanation. What is needed, 
as Salmon eventually concludes, is a causal relation. 
Hempel for a long time resisted the suggestion that facts 
about causation played any special role in explanation 
(Hempel, 1965). Over the years, however, due in part to 
the development of sophisticated empiricist accounts of 
causation, this has become a minority view.
The third class of objections to the DN account focuses 
on the account’s requirements that every explanation cite 
a law, and that (except in probabilistic explanation) the 
law or laws be strong enough to entail, given appropriate 
boundary conditions, the explanadum. One way to 
develop the objection is to point to everyday explanations 
that cite the cause of an event as its explanation, without 
mentioning any covering law, as when you cite a patch of 
ice on the road as the cause of a
Motorcycle accident. More important for the study 
of explanation in science are varieties of explanation in 
which there is no prospect and no need for, either the 
entailment or the probabilification of the explanadum. 
Perhaps the best example of all is Darwinian explanation, 
in which a trait T of some species is explained by pointing 
to the way in which T enhanced, directly or indirectly, the 
reproductive prospects of its possessor. Attempting to fit 
Darwinian explanation into the DN framework creates 
a host of problems, among which the most intractable is 
perhaps the following: for every trait that evolved because 
it benefited its possessors in some way, there are many 
other, equally valuable traits that did not evolve, perhaps 
because the right mutation did not occur, perhaps for more 
systematic reasons (for example, the trait’s evolution 
would have required a dramatic reconfiguration of the 
species’ developmental pathways) (Scriven, 1962. pp.477-
482). To have a DN explanation of T, you would have to 
produce a deductive argument entailing that T, and none 
of the alternatives, evolved. You would have to be in a 
position, in other words, to show that T had to evolve. Not 
only does this seem close to impossible; more importantly, 
it seems unnecessary for understanding the appearance 
of T. You can understand the course of evolution without 
retrospectively predicting it’s every twist and turn.
Hempel is aware of the problem with Darwinian 
explanation. His response is to argue that there is no such 
thing: faced with a choice between the DN account and 
Darwinian explanation, we should opt for the former, 
and consider Darwinian stories to be at best partial 
explanations of traits (Hempel, 1965). He advocates a 
similar deflationary treatment of functionalist explanation 
in sociology and of historical explanations that are not 
entailments.
As a result of these weaknesses some critics opted for 
Inductive Statistical model (IS). The inductive-statistical 
or IS account, in many ways parallels the DN account of 
deterministic event explanation. Like a DN explanation, 
an IS explanation is a law-involving argument giving 
good reason to expect that the explanadum event occurred. 
However, whereas a DN explanation is a deductive 
argument entailing the explanadum, an IS explanation 
is an inductive argument conferring high probability on 
the explanadum. Hempel’s example is the explanation of 
James Musa’s swift recovery from a strep infection. The 
probability of a swift recovery without the administration 
of penicillin, Hempel supposes, is 0.1, while the 
probability with penicillin is 0.9. Citing Jones’s infection, 
his treatment with penicillin, and the resulting high 
probability of recovery, then, confers a high probability 
on Musa’s swift recovery; in the circumstances you would 
expect him to recover swiftly. This inductive argument is 
sufficient, in Hempel’s view, to explain the swift recovery.
Induct ive soundness  imposes  one addi t ional 
requirement that has no parallel in deductive logic. 
Suppose you know that Jones’s strain of strep is resistant 
to penicillin. An inductive argument is said to be sound 
only if all relevant background knowledge is taken into 
account; consequently,
an inductive argument for Jones’s swift recovery 
must cite the infection’s penicillin resistance. But once 
the new premise is added, the argument will no longer 
confer a high probability on its conclusion. This is what is 
wanted: there ought to be no inductive argument for swift 
recovery—you ought not to expect swift recovery—when 
the strep is known to be resistant.
Hempel imposes a similar requirement on IS 
explanations, which he calls the requirement of maximal 
specificity. In virtue of this requirement, it is not possible 
to explain Jones’s swift recovery by citing treatment with 
penicillin when the infection is known to be penicillin 
resistant. As with the DN account of explanation, a 
number of objections to the IS account have exerted a 
strong influence on the subsequent development of the 
philosophical study of explanation. Versions of both the 
relevance and the causal objections apply to the IS account 
as well as to the DN account. I will briefly describe two 
other important criticisms.
First is the complaint that it is too much to ask that 
explanations confer high probability on their explanandum. 
In many ways, this is the analogue of the third objection 
to the DN account above; in the same paper that Scriven 
expresses doubts about the existence of a DN treatment 
of Darwinian explanation, he describes the following 
example, best conceived of, I think, as an objection to 
the is account. The probability that John Jones contracts 
paresis, a form of tertiary syphilis that attacks the central 
nervous system, given that he has untreated secondary 
syphilis, is very low. But only syphilitics contract paresis. 
It seems reasonable to cite untreated syphilis, then, as 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
The Scientificity of the Social Sciences: A Reflection on 
the Deductive Nomological Model of Explanation
114
explaining John Jones’s paresis, though the explanation 
confers only a low probability on the explanadum. 
(Scriven, M. Op. Cit., pp.170-230)
The proponent of the IS account is committed to 
rejecting such attempts at explanation, as Hempel 
does, arguing that in such cases we have only a partial 
explanation of why the patient contracted syphilis. This is 
perhaps one of the most convincing of Hempel’s defenses, 
but the paresis example is nevertheless widely regarded as 
posing a serious problem for the expectability approach 
to explanation. A second objection to the IS account 
focuses on the requirement of maximal specificity. 
The requirement insists that all relevant background 
knowledge must be included in a probabilistic event 
explanation, but it does not require that relevant but 
unknown information be taken into account. In particular, 
if John Jones’s infection is penicillin resistant, but this fact 
is not known to the explainer, then the IS account deems 
the explainer’s appeal to the administration of penicillin 
as a perfectly good explanation of Jones’s swift recovery.
As Coffa argues, this is surely not correct. If the 
infection is resistant to penicillin, then the administration of 
penicillin cannot explain the recovery, regardless of what 
the explainer does and does not know. The requirement 
of maximal specificity makes probabilistic explanation 
relative to the explainer’s epistemic situation, then, in a way 
that it very much appears not to be. This objection hits right 
at the heart of the expectability conception of explanation, 
suggesting that explanation is not an epistemic matter in the 
least. (Coffa, 1974, pp.141-163)
Salmon identifies three types of Hempel’s law 
challengers; interpretivists, nomological skeptics and 
critical theorists (Salmon, 1984, p.326). Interpretivism 
- interpretivists consider explanations of human action 
completely different from causal explanations or any law-
related explanations. Interpretivists strongly believe that it 
is a logical error to use empirical laws to relate a cause to 
an action.
Nomological skepticism as a philosophical stream 
doubts that there are actually laws in social sciences 
to construct covering-law explanations. These doubts 
are pragmatic in contrast to the logical ones of the 
interpretivists. Skeptics believe that the great variability 
and complexity of human behavior pose practical barriers 
to framing generalizations that are at once informative 
and true. Critical theorists argue that lawful explanations 
threaten human autonomy and they focus attention on the 
ethical implications of trying to explain human behavior 
in the same manner that we explain the actions of non-
conscious physical objects.
CONCLUSION 
With this assessment of the DN model of explanation 
we might want to ask “Are social sciences really 
sciences?” considering the fact that they both uses the 
model of DN method of explanation. Can we explain 
everything just by using physics as the fundamental 
science? We are strongly of the view that the social 
sciences are sciences. Science itself do not enjoy a single 
method (some have even argued that anything should 
go) and they sometimes make value judgment. One can 
then say that the method of DN model of explanation 
despites it’s various weaknesses, can serve as a method 
of explanation both in the social and natural sciences. 
Furthermore, the demarcation between science, non-
science, pseudo-science and social science is facile given 
the tenability of the DN model of explanation. 
REFERENCES
Achinstein, P., Feigl, H., & Maxwell, G. (1964). Scientific 
explanation, space, and time (1st ed., Vol.3). Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Bruder, R. S. (1966). Philosophy of social science. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, Inc..
Coffa, A. (1974). Hempel’s ambiguity, New York: Prentice Hall, 
Inc.. 
Ehiakhamen, J. O. (2005). Introductory readings in philosophy 
of the social sciences: A monograph series. Ekpoma: De 
Winner Printer. 
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and 
other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: Free 
Press. 
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, p.(1965). “Studies in the logic 
of explanation” in Philosophy of Science 1948 reproduced 
in Hempel, Carl G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New 
York: Free Press.
Okasha, S. (2002). Explanation in science. Philosophy of 
Science: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ryan, A. (1970). The philosophy of the social sciences, London: 
The Macmillan Press.
Salmon, W. C. (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal 
structure of the world. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Salmon, W. C. (1989). Four decades of scientific explanation. 
University of Minnesota.
Scriven, M. (1962). Explanations, Predictions, and Laws. 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3, 170-230.
